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default and the
thereon was void. ( Castagnoli
124 Cal.App.2d 39, 41 [268 P.2d 37].)
The order is reversed.

unc

C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Schauer,
and McComb, J., concurred.
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petition for a rehearing was denied :F'ebruary
1956.
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[Crim. No. 5758.

In Bank.

Feb. 3, 1956.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. GEORGE H. MARTIN,
Appellant.
[1] Searches and Seizures-Justification For.-The presence of
two men in a parked automobile on a lover's lane at night
is itself reasonable cause for police investigation, and their
sudden flight from the officers and the inference therefrom
that they are guilty of some crime leaves no doubt as to the
reasonableness and necessity for an investigation, and under
such circumstances it is reasonable for the officers to order
the suspects to put their hands in front of them and to get
out of an automobile to be searched before being questioned.
[2] !d.-Justification For.-Where officers had reasonable ground
to pursue suspects and, on overtaking them, to order them to
put their hands in front of them, whereupon one officer saw
a small bag in the front seat of an automobile which had been
covered by their hands, he had reasonable cause to believe
that their possession of it prompted their flight and that it
contained contraband, and was therefore justified in taking
it from the car.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County and from an order denying a new trial. Donald
K. Quayle, Judge. Judgment affirmed; appeal from order
dismissed.
Prosecution for illegal possession of marijuana. Judgment
of conviction affirmed.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Searches and Seizures, § 1.
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IL Martin, in
appointment by the
G. Brown, Attorney
Clarence A.
Attorney General, and Arlo E.
Attorney General, for Hespondent.

J~inn,

J.-Defendant appeals from a
of
entered on a jury verdict
him guilty of
one count of possessing marijuana in violation of Health and
Code, section 11500. He also appeals from an order
that he claims was entered denying his motion for a new
The record, however, does not disclose that a motion
new trial was made or that an order denying it was
The latter appeal must therefore be dismissed.
Offieers MeCann and Price of the Oakland Poliee Department were on automobile patrol duty during the evening of
.Jnly
1954. At about 11 o'elock, while driving in a southerly direction on Poplar Street near 21st Street, they observed
a car parked on the opposite side of the street headed in
tlH~ opposite direction.
As they passed the car, Officer
::\IcCaun turned his spotlight on it and saw two men sitting
in the front seat. He testified: ''. . . it is a lover's lane.
If
had been a female and a male I wouldn't have thought
too much of it bnt two males in that vicinity I figured we
had better check it out and a:> I brought the patrol car around
to make a U -turn on Poplar Street the sm;pects' car took
off.
spun their wheels taking off at a high rate of speed.
turned right onto 21st Street and proceeded up 21st
Street and turned right again on Union Street which wonld
put them heading in a southern direction again on Union
Strert and they turned east on 19th Street and all this time
I had the red light and siren on and I brought the patrol
car
np there on their left rear and very close and stopped
them in front of 1181 - 19th Street.'' Officer McCann apthe car from the left, and Officer Price from the
right, and one of them flashed his flashlight into the car.
Robel't Dial, who later pleaded gnilty to the charge of possesmarijuana, was in the <1riv<'r's seaL Defendant waR
on tlte right-hand side of the front :seaL Dial's right
hand and defendant's ldt hand wet'r• on the cr'uter of the
seaL The offieers ordt>red the ~n"pel'ts to
tbeir lwtHb
m
of them, and wlwn ilwy did so Officer McCa 11 n saw
a small bag in the middle of the front seat that had been
covered by their hands. The officers ordered the suspects
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out of the car, and after searching them for weapons Officer
McCann reached into the car and took the bag. He examined
it and concluded that it contained
Later analysis
confirmed this conclusion.
Defendant contends that the search of the automobile
a warrant was unlawful and that the evidence prowas therefore inadmissible.
[1]
the presence of two men in a parked automobile on a lover's lane at
was itself reasonable cause
for
People v. Simon, 45 Oal.2d 645,
649-651
; Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal.App.
13, 16-17
) , their sudden flight from the officers
and the inference that could reasonably be drawn therefrom
that
were guilty of some crime (United States v. Heitner,
149 F .2d 105, 107), left no doubt not only as to the reasonableness but as to the necessity for an investigation. (Husty
v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700-701 [51 S.Ct. 240, 75
L.Ed. 629, 74 A.L.R. 1407]; Talley v. United States, 159
F.2d 703; Levine v. United States, 138 F.2d 627, 628-629;
Jones v. United States, 131 F.2d 539, 541.) Under these
circumstances the officers were justified in taking precautionary measures to assure their own safety on overtaking
the suspects, and it was therefore reasonable for them to
order the suspects to put their hands in front of them and
to get out of the automobile to be searched for weapons before
being questioned. [2] When Officer McCann saw the bag
that was uncovered when the suspects removed their hands,
he had reasonable cause to believe that their possession of it
prompted the flight and that it contained contraband. He
was therefore justified in taking it from the automobile.
(Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 [45 S.Ot. 280,
69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790] ; Husty v. United States, supra,
282 U.S. 694, 700-701; Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251,
255 [59 S.Ot. 174, 83 L.Ed. 151] ; Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 165-171 [69 S.Ot. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879]; United
States v. One 1946 Plymouth Sedan Automobile, 167 F.2d
3, 7.)
The judgment is affirmed, and the appeal from an alleged
order denying a motion for new trial is dismissed.
Gibson, 0. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and
McComb, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
It appears to me that the following statement from the
majority opinion is most astounding: ''Although the pres-

when bas there been a curfew for adults? Since when
been illegal for two men to converse at
? Since the
rooms, private homes and offices and
has become so prevalent, almost the
ueOi:omcu, who wish their conversation to remain private, can
is in an automobile on a sparsely traveled street or
secluded place. And, if their mere presence in a parked
is held to warrant police investigation, it appears
that private conversations must also be held illegal and the
of privacy nonexistent.
must be remembered that the F'ourth Amendment to
Constitution of the United States was adopted for the
of all of the people of this country, and that
19 of article I of the Constitution of California was
for the protection of all of the people of this state.
object and purpose of the framers of these constitutional
mandates was to guarantee and make secure the fundamental
of privacy to every person-the right to be secure
police surveillance unless the police have reasonable
to believe that an offense is being committed. This
does not mean mere suspicion as some of our courts have
indicated. The obvious reason for the rule that
evidence obtained as the result of an illegal searcll, cannot
be
against the victim of the search, is to protect innocent
by discouraging such searches. It is a matter of common knowledge that it has been the practice of law enforcement officers of this state to make searches of the persons
and property of individuals whenever they saw fit regardless
of whether reasonable or any cause existed, and many innopeople have been subjected to the indignity and humiliation of having their persons, homes, offices and automobiles
searched by law enforcement officers with impunity when
of an ineriminating nature was found and no arrests
or prosecutions resulted therefrom. Many of these invasions
of the constitutional right of privaey received no public
mention because the victims did not wish to incur the expense
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and •·ndnre the ineonvenic-ncP and publicity incidental to
redress in the eonrts. It is probable that for every
case where evidence of a crime has been found there have
been numerous
searches whieh uneovered no evidence
and we know from the reported cases that the
of illegal searches in this state has increased many
fold in recent years. The American way of life does not
lend itself to such totalitarian practices. There is no place
in our body politic for the Gestapo, the storm trooper or the
commissar. Ours is a system of ordered liberty which is
made more secure
placing a magistrate between the citizens
and the overzealous law enforcement officer. ·while this
the guilty as well as the innocent against
system must
an unlawful search and seizure, its effect on criminal prosecutions in this field is no different than any of the other safeguards embraced in the Bill of Rights which are designed
to protect the life, liberty and property of our people against
deprivation without due process of law. Each and every one
of these safeguards operates as an impediment against the
conviction of the guilty as well as the innocent. Yet, this
is necessary in any system of ordered liberty. If the above
mentioned constitutional provisions have any meaning whatsoever, then the victim of an illegal search may assert the
right of privacy guaranteed to him and resist such search.
If he does so, either he or the officer may be injured or killed.
If this should occur, where should the blame fall T Obviously,
a prosecutor who favors such illegal conduct on the part of
law enforcement officers would be disposed to prosecute the
victim of the illegal search if he should injure or kill the
officer in his effort to resist the search, and would not prosecute the officer who injured or killed the victim in the
forcible execution of his illegal project.
From the intemperate and misleading statements appearing in the public press recently as having been made by heads
of police departments and prosecuting officers of this state
against the rule in the Cahan case, we are forced to assume
that they feel that great credit and high praise should go
to those law enforcing officers who ruthlessly violate the above
mentioned constitutional guarantees, and that hatred, contempt, ridicule and obloquy should be heaped upon those
who insist upon their observance and preservation. I will
again repeat what I have said many times both as a private
citizen and as a public official of this state, that I have a
sincere devotion to the American system for the administration of justice as postulated by the Constitution of the United
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S1
and the Bill of Rights that I can coneeive of no
eJ11ergency short of a threat to our national
which
justify striking down any of the
for the
of the rights of the people cmbraeed within that
'fhe impediments against law
the
eseur1e of some criminals from convietion and
·the cost to the public incidental to the
stem, fades into insignificance when we offset and balanee
those factors the glorious feeling wll ieh stems from
the eonsciousness that, because of this
we live in an
where we may enjoy life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness with dignity and ,;elf-respect, secure against
anv invasion of our fundamental personal rights without
du~ nrocess of law.
·
elder Pitt, in his speech on the l<jxeise 'l'ax, gave
to what later became the B'ourth Amendment.
\Ylwt he said then is just as important today. He said that
"The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the
forvrs of the crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the
,dnds may blow throug-h it; tll(• ~tonus may enter; the rain
ma.v enter-hut the King of England cannot enter. All his
forC',:s eannot cross the threshold of the rnitwd tenement."
Yd. prior to the decision in the Cahan case, the police and
otlu•r so-ealled law enforcement officers in California could
force their way into the home of a private eitizen,
anrl without a sr'arch warrant, seize whatever they found and
nse Jt as evidenee in onr courts notwithstanding they violated
the coJJstitutional right-the right of privaey-of the citizen
in obtaining it.
Another great Englishman, I .. ord Coke, had this to say
on J his same subject: "The house of everyone is to him as his
castln and fortrrss, as wrll for his defrnse against injury and
1·ioknee as for his repose.''
Jnr. ,Justice Holmes, in his great dissent in OlmstearZ Y.
United States, 277 TJ.S. 488, 469, 470 f48 S.Ct. G64, 72 I.~.Ed.
944, nG A.L.R 376], had this to say: "But I think, as Mr .
.Jnslin; Brandei:;; says, that apart from the (;onstitntion the
goy,•rmnfmt oug-ht not to nse evidence obtained am1 only obtainable by a r·riminal act . . . . ['VVle m11st eonsidr·r the two
of rlesire, both of whieh wr; eH!liJOt have anrl mal<e
up rm mimlR ·whir•h to ehoose. Tt is rtesir<JlJle that criminals
should be rleteet.erl, ;u](lio that end that all availnhle nvidem·e
shonld b0 nsed. It also is r1PRirable that the g·overnmcnt
Rhonl,l not itsPJf foster atHl pa.v for other r~rimes. when they
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which the evidence is to be obtained. I:f
officers for
got evidence by crime I do
may not as well pay them for getting it in the
and I can attach no importance to protestations of
if it knowingly accepts and pays and announces
in future it will pay for the fruits. We have to choose,
and
my
I think
a less ev,il that some criminals
shottld play an
shmtld escape than that the
I am in full accord with the views expressed by Mr. Justice
in People v.
45 Cal.2d 645, 650 [290 P.2d
531], where he said: "In the present case the officer searched
first and asked questions only after his search uncovered the
incriminating cigarette, and there is nothing to indicate that
had he confined himself to a reasonable inquiry, he would
have discovered anything to confirm his suspicion that de.
fendant had no lawful right to be where he was.
"Under these circumstances, to permit an officer to justify
a search on the ground that he 'didn't feel' that a person
on the street at night had any lawful business there would
expose anyone to having his person searched by any suspicious
officer no matter how unfounded the suspicions were. Innocent people, going to or from evening jobs or entertainment,
or walking for exercise or enjoyment, would suffer along with
the occasional criminal who would be turned up. As pointed
out by Mr. Justice Jackson in a similar case, 'We meet in this
case, as in many, the appeal to necessity. It is said that if
such arrests and searches cannot be made, law enforcement
will be more difficult and uncertain. But the forefathers,
after consulting the lessons of history, designed our Constitution to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating
police surveillance, which they seemed to think was a greater
danger to a free people than the escape of some criminals
from punishment. Taking the law as it has been given to us,
this arrest and search were beyond the lawful authority of
those who executed them.' (United States v. Di Re, supra,
332 U.S. 581,595 [68 S.Ct. 222,92 L.Ed. 210].)" (Emphasis
added.) In Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal.App. 13, 16, 17 [98 P.
43], the court said: ''A police officer has a right to make
inquiry in a pt·oper manner of anyone upon the public streets
at a late hour as to his identity and the occasion of his presence, if the surroundings are suck as to indicate to a reasonable
man that the pttblic safety demands such identification. The
fact that crimes had recently been committed in that neigh-
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ntif'f: at
late hour was found in the
refused to answer proper questions estabhis
, were circumstances which should lead a
officer to
his presence at the station, where
might make more minute and careful
added.) Here, even after the chase, the
were ordered to put their
and ordered to
out of the car.
that the very sight of the two men
car justified a police investigation, the majority
on their flight from the officers. In United States v.
, 149 F.2d 105, lOG, the officers involved had been
police headquarters to watch a certain building
\Yas suspected a still was being operated. Two men
out of the building and 1vere followed by the officers
them. They went back to the building and the
or flight, ensued when the tiro men returned there.
obvious from a reading of the case that the facts there
more than the presence of two men in a car to warrant
tl1e "earch. In Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700 [51
75 r_...Ed. 629, 74 A.L.R. 1407], the facts showed
that on the day of petitioner's arrest, the officer had reinformation that Husty had two loads of liquor in
described automobiles which were parked in "parplaces on named streets.'' The court held that the
inf,;;·mation received prior to the arrest was sufficient to show
ble cause for the arrest. In the instant case, we have
fact that two men were parked in an automobile at
n
and their flight from the investigating officers to establish probable cause. In Talley v. United States, 159 F.2c1 703,
the eourt noted that "there was advance information suffiitself to justify the search. But, more than that,
was actual evidence of conduct, ineluding flight, transin the presence of the officers" to justify their search.
v. United States, 138 F.2d 627, there was also adreliable information that the appellant had illegal
of alcohol prior to the search by the officers. In
United States, 131 F.2d 539, probable cause for the
was found to exist because the officers had kept the
aef·nst•d premisf'S nnder surveillanee for about three months
thereto.
the 1mmmary set forth above of the cases relied on
majority it appears that they are readily distinguishablr. In all of them there was advance information that

i;.-
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a crime was being committed together with flight from law
enforcement officers. In the instant case there was only the
sight of two men in a parked car and their flight after the
police started their investigation. In People v. Brown, 45
Cal.2d 640 [290 P.2d 528], we held that a search incident
to an arrest could not be justified in the absence of reasonable
cause under section 836 of the Penal Code merely because it
revealed that defendant was in fact guilty of a felony.
(People v. Simon, 45 Cal.2d 645, 648 [290 P.2d 531].)
There was, therefore, under the facts here present no reasonable cause to justify the search and the evidence was inadmissible. (People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905].)
I would therefore reverse the judgment.

[Crim. No. 5759.

In Bank.

Feb. 3, 1956.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ERNEST BLODGETT
[DON WILLIAMS], Appellant.
[1] Searches and Seizures-Justification for.-A search of a cab
cannot be justified on the ground that the cab driver could
have been arrested for double parking, >Iince it has no relation
to the traffic violation and would not be incidental to an arrest
therefor.
[2] Arrest--Without Warrant.-There is nothing unreasonable in
an officer's questioning persons outdoors at night, or in ordering them out of a cab for questioning at night where their
unusual conduct warrants it.
[3] Searches and Seizures-Justification for.-Where an officer,
who had reasonable grounds for ordering suspects from a cab
for questioning, saw defendant's furtive action in withdrawing
his left hand from behind the seat at the juncture of the seat
and back cushion, the officer had reasonable grounds to believe
that defendant was hiding contraband, and a search of the
cab was reasonable.
[4a, 4b] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of
Prosecuting Attorney.-In a prosecution for illegal possession
of marijuana, misconduct of the prosecuting attorney in attempting to suggest to the jury that defendant had taken
heroin the evening before his arrest did not constitute ground
[1] See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Searches and Seizures, § 52 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Searches and Seizures, § 1; [2]
Arrest, § 5; [4] Criminal Law, § 1404(6);
Witnesses, § 100.

